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THEDEMANDFOR CIGARETTES AND RESTRICTIONS ON SMOKING
IN THE WORKPLACE
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the effect
that restrictive clean air laws have on the level of smoking.
Restrictive clean air laws refers to the laws which prohibit
smoking in private workplaces as well as in public places. The
data employed In this stody consist of a time series of cross
sections of the fifty states of the U.S., and Washington D.C.,
over the time period from 1975 through 1985, Since states where
sentiment is strongly against cigarettes are sore likely to pass
a clean air law, endogeneity between cigarette demand and the
clean air law is a problem. A two step estimation model is used
to control for endogeneity. Both a single equation and a two
equation model of cigarette demand were estimated. The single
equation results indicate that a clean air law has a significant
negative effect on cigarette demand. However, the two equation
model indicates that cigarette demand has a significant negative
effect on the probability of passing a clean air law. The results
indicate that when endogeneity is controlled for the clean air
law dose not have a significant effect on cigarette demand. This
does not imply that the enactment of a clean air law would not
reduce the level of smoking if such a law were imposed in all
states, but rather that only states with low levels of smoking
are able to pass restrictive clean sir laws.
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Department of Economics Department of Economics
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University of Illinios Union, New Jersey 07083
Chicago, Illinois 606801. Introduction
A number of state and local governments have recently
enacted legislation restricting cigarette smoking in public
places. These laws are the consequence of new research concerning
the effects of cigarette smoke on the health of nonsmokers. This
link, first suggested by the Surgeon General in 1972. was firmly
estebliahed in his 1986 Report on the Health Consequences of
Involuntary Smoking. The major conclusion of the report was that
cigarette smoke presents a greater hazard to nonsmokers than do
all other air pollutants. The Surgeon General also concluded that
exposure to cigarette smoke can cause lung cancer in otherwise
healthy nonsmokers. The report also concluded that the simple
separation of saokers and nonsmokers, within the same air space,
may lower but will not eliminate the hazards of exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke.
A number of states have had laws restricting smoking for
many years. These older laws were enacted with the intent of
preventing fire or food contamination. The new anti-smoking
laws, beginning in 1975 with the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act,
are enacted in an attempt to discourage cigarette smoking and are
designed to limit the nonsmokers' exposure to tobacco smoke in
public places.1 This type of law has become known as a "clean
That this is the intent of these laws can be seen from the
phrases introducing the restrictions. For example, the Alaska
law begins "smoking is declared a nuisance and a public health
hazard."Similsrly, the Minnesota and Nevada laws are enacted
"for the purpose of protecting public health, comfort, and
1indoor air law". These laws generally prohibit smoking in health
care facilities, retail stores, public transportation, public
meeting rooms, and schools, and require restaurants to provide
non—smoking mections. The most restrictive of theme new laws also
prohibits smoking in private workplaces.
Althoughseveral states have alreadyenacted very
restrictive forms of clean indoor air laws, and many other states
and municipalities are considering these laws, there has been no
econometric study of what effect these restrictions have on
cigarette amoking. The purpose of this paper is to eapiricslly
evaluste the effect of restrictive clean air laws on the level of
smoking. Restrictive clean air laws refers to the laws which
prohibit smoking in private workplaces am well as in public
places. The focus on private workplace clean air laws is
important because this type of law has been recommended by the
Surgeon General (1986), and represents the direction of future
anti—smoking legislation.
II. Analytical Framework
The empirical modelis derived from a theoretical model
consisting of an Individual maximizing utility subject to an
appropriate budget constraint, where one of the arguments in the
individual's utility function is cigarettes. Constrained up--
environment by prohibiting smoking in public places"(Tn—
Agency Tobacco Free Project, 1986; U.S. Department of Health and
Human Servicem, 1986).
2timization of this utility function yields a demand for cigaret—
tes as a function of the price of cigarettes, the prices of other
goods, income, and taste. The theoretical model predicts that the
price of cigarettes will have a negative effect on the demand for
cigarettes. Since clean air laws impose difficulties or costs on
individuals who wish to smoke, clean air laws can be included in
the demand for cigarettes equation as a measure of the full price
of cigarette smoking. This equation can be aggregated across
Individuals to yield anempirically estimabledemand for
cigarettes equation which includes a clean air law, the relative
price of cigarettes, income, and a variety of other factors.
Empirical estimation of the cigarette demand equation is,
however, hampered by the potential endogeneity of the clean air
law. Warner (198la, 198lb) argues that states where smoking is
less prevalent are sore likely to pass clean air laws. The
endogeneity of the law can becontrolled forwithin an
econometric framework presented by Saffer and Grossman (1987). To
develop this model let, S equal an unobserved variable measuring
exogenous sentiment against smoking, S equal an unobserved
variable measuring pressure to pass a clean air law, D equal a
dichotomous variable equal to one if a state has a clean air law,
C equal cigarette consumption, Cequal cigarette consumption
when there Is no clean air law, X1 equal a matrix of exogenous
variables affecting C,and X2 equal a matrix of exogenous
variables affecting S. The model can be written as:(1) C =X1)3fOD +aSPi
(2) 5Xa2 +
where3',13a. 6, a are coefficients and pi end p2 are error
terms, Equation (1) assumes that cigarette consumption is s
consequence of exogenous regressors (X,)a clean air law (D)
and sentiment against cigarettes (5). The sentiment variable (5),
in equation (1). is necessary because such sentiment can have an
independent effect on cigarette consumption. In states where
sentiment is strongly against cigarettes, individuals may smoke
less and thus the state consumption level willbe lower than in
states where smoking is more acceptable. The effect of sentiment
on smoking is independent of clean air laws. Since states where
sentiment isstrongly against cigarettes are more likely to pass
a clean air law, exclusion of the sentiment vsrieble will result
in an overstatement of the effect of the clean air law. Sentiment
towards cigarette smoking is assumed to bea function of ex-
ogenous variables much as the amount of tobacco production in the
state, the fraction of the state population that belong to
fondaaentaiist religions, and education, as expressed by equation
(2), While sentiment against smoking may be exogenous, pressure
to pass a clean aIr law, S, may be a function of the level of
cigarette consumption. That ia, in a state with lower cigarette
consumption, pressure to pass a clean air law may be greeter.
Exogenous sentiment, 5, can also affect pressure to pass a clean
4air law. These relationships are expressed as:
(3) S +
Aclean air lew, 0, acts as an indicator of the unobserved
variable S. The relationship between Sand 0is defined as
follows: if D1 then S>k1,and if D0 then S ￿ k1, where k1
is an arbitrary and unknown constant. The variable C is the
cigarette consusption level when there is no clean air law and
the paraaeter 0is a weight. The variabie S has no weight
because, as an unobserved variable, its measurement scale is
unknown.
To estiaate the model, substitute equation (2) into equation
(1) which results in:
(4) C =X1131+X3a+óD+v
and substitute equations (1) and (2) into equation (3) to get:
(5) =X)310+(l+aO)Xj32+v.
The dummy variable, D,does not appear in equation (6) because
pressure to pass a clean airlaw only exists where there is no
law.The model can be estimated using a two stage procedure. The
first step is the probt estimation of equation (5), with D
replacing S. The predicted probability of a state passing a
clean air law results from this procedure. Let this predicted
probability be defined as S. The variable S" is continuous
with upper and lower values of 1 and 0 respectively. The second
step is the estimation of equation (4) with S" replacing 0.
Equation (4) is estimated with weighted least squares.
III. Data
The data employed in this study consist of a time series of
state cross sections covering the fifty states of the U.S. and
Washington D.C. over the period from 1975 through 1985. The
The prob.it estimation of equation (5)is consistent and
efficient. Elowever, in equation (4), since S replaces 0 the two
step procedure is consistent but not efficient. Maddala (1983)
provides a method for computation of the correct covariance
matrix. For notational convenience let X =[ XX ],(unweighted
data), L =[ XX S ],.(welghteddata), A [3I3a 8 1.
=[ 3(1+oe) ],o,estimated variance of the error term
from the reduced form consumption equation. o =estimated
variance of v, estimated covariance of v and v, V0 =
estimatedcovariance matrix of A, the variance of A then equals
(o —2Oo,)(LL)+o(L'L)L'XV0XL(LL).Estimation of
equations (4),(5), and the reduced form consumption equation
provides consistent estimates of 6 and data to compute o, o
and a
Equations(4)and (5)are both identified even though
Identical exogenous variables are used in the two equations and
v and v are correlated. Identification results from the use of
D in equation (4) and Sin equation (5). Under these conditions
equation (4)can be distinguished from any linear combination of
equations (4)and (5). EmpirIcally, estimation Is possible
because equation (5) is a nonlinear specification.
6definitions, means, and standard deviations of the variables use
are given in Table 1.
The cigarette consumption data and price data are obtained
from the Tobacco Institute's annual compilations The TaxBurden
on Tobacco and Municipal Tax Surveys. The consumptiondata are
per capita tax—paid sales in thousands of packs percapita,
calculated based on cigarette excise tax revenue collected bythe
state. The cigarette price data include all Federal, state,and
local excise taxes imposed on cigarettes as well as any state
level sales taxes applied to cigarettes. The cigarette price is a
weighted average of the prices of single—pack, carton,and
vending machine sales, where the weights are the fractionsof
each in total sales at the national level. The variation in
cigarette prices arises from the significant differencesin
cigarette excise taxes across states.
The workplace clean air law is a dichotomous variable equal
to one ifa state has a law restricting cigarette smoking in
private workplaces and is equal to zero otherwise. Thisvariable
was taken from the U.S. Department of Health and HumanServices'
1986 report to Congress Smoking and Health: A National Status
Report.
Due to the significant differences in cigarette excise tax
rates across states, part of the differences in cigarette sales
observed between states is the result of both casual and or-
ganized smuggling of cigarettes from lower tax states to higher
tax states. Cigarette smuggling is facilitated by the ease with
7which cigarettes can be transported across state lines and the
ability to store cigarettes for later consumption, and is
encouraed by the potential profit from this transport (Advisory
Commission onIntergovernmental Relations, 1977). Casual
smuggling is defined as purchases of cigarettes in nearby lower
tax states for consumption in one's own higher tax states end is
captured by two variables, short distance exports and short
distance imports. These purchases are assumed to be incidental to
the purpose of the trip, with the incentive for short distance
smuggling rising as the difference between the own-price and
border—price increases, and the magnitude of the problem depend-
ing on the population near the border between the states. Long
distance, organized smuggling isdefined as the transport of
cigarettes from low price states to higher price states for
resale, The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
described organized smuggling as the major problem, with the
majority of the smuggled cigarettes coming from the three aajor
The short distance import variable for state i is defined
as follows:
Imports =E3K13(Price1 —Price3)
where K3 is the fraction of the population in the higher price,
importing statei living within twenty miles of the lower price,
exporting state j.The sum is taken over all lower price border
states. The short distance export variable is defined as
follows:
Exports =E4K31(Price1 —Price3)(POP3/PoP)
where K3 is the fraction of the population in the higher price
state j living within twenty miles of the lower price state i,
and POPS is the population of state i.This sum is taken over
all higher price border states. When there are significant local
excise taxes (New York city and Cook County. Illinois, for
example) the prices used to compute the short distance import and
export variables are the relevant local prices, not the average
state price.
8tobacco producing states, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Vir-
ginia.8 Both casual and organized cigarette smuggling were an
important problem during the period covered by the data set, with
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1977 and
1985) estimating lost revenues in higher tax states at $391
million in 1975 and $255 million in 1983. Each of these variables
is expected to be negatively related to per capita cigarette
sales, the measure of consumption employed in the estimation of
thecigarettedemandequations. For states which export
cigarettes, the Incentive to export both short distances and long
distances increases ss the difference between own—state price and
importing-state price becomes larger (more negative), and, as a
8Thelong distance smuggling variable is based on several
assumptions. Virginia and North Carolina are sssumed to share
the long distance exporting to all states in the Northeast and
Southeast as well as any state within 500 miles of either. All
Western states within 1000 miles of Kentucky are assumed to
import from Kentucky. States which are more than 1000 miles from
Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky are amsuaed to do no long
distance importing. Based on these assumptions, the long
distance smuggling variable is computed am follows:
Long Distance1 =(P1-P8,,)if importing from KY
Long Distance1 =kNc(Pj
-PNC)+ k(P1 -PVA)if importing
from North Carolina and Virginia
Long DistanceKV =L(PKV —Pj(P0P3/P0P)
where the j indicates as state importing from Kentucky
Long Distance3 =Sk(P3 -Pfl(POP1/POPj)
where j=NC, VA and i indicates states importing from
North Carolina and Virginia.
The weights and kvA are based on the value added in the
production of cigarettes in North Carolina and Virginia as a
fraction of the sum of the two using data taken from the Census
of Manufacturers.
9result, own—state sales increase. Similarly,for importing
states, the lnrentive to purchase cigarettes out—of—state rather
than ft stata increases as the difference between own-state and
out—of—stata price increases, leading to lower in-state sales.
The cigarette price data and all smuggling variables were
deflated by the annual national Consuaer Price Index, 1967=1, to
take account of trends in the prices of other goods during this
period. Each estimated equationalso containstime dummy
variables to control for trends in the price and other data.
Real per capita disposable income is also included in the
demand equations estimated. The income data are published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Three additional variables are included in the model as
determinants of exogenous sentiment towards cigarette smoking.
The first measure of exogenous sentiment is tobacco produc-
tion per capita. In states with relatively high levels of tobacco
production there is likely to be strong positive sentiment
towards cigarette smoking.In these states, laws restricting
cigarette smoking may be difficult to pass and, hence, this
variable is expected to have a negative effect on the probability
of passing such laws. These data are taken from the Statistical
Abstract.
The second measure of exogenous sentiment is religious
fundamentalism. Since fundamentalist religions oppose the use of
tobacco, states with relatively high concentrations of fundamen-
talist adherents are likely to have lower per capita cigarette
10sales and to be more likely to pass laws prohibiting cigarette
smoking in various places. The fundamentalist religion arlable
is defined as the fraction of the state population tiat are
either Mormons or Southern Baptists. These data are available
only for the years 1971 and 1980 from the Glenniary Research
Center. Estimates for the remaining years were computed by
logarithmic trend.
The third measure of exogenous sentiment is education.
Education is measured by the fraction of the state population
with at least a high school education. More educated individuals
are assumed to be more aware of the health consequences of
cigarette smoking and, asa result, to smoke less, Thus, states
with a greater fraction of high school graduates are expected to
have lower per capita cigarette sales, ceteris paribus. These
data were taken from the 1970 and 1980 Census of the Population
with intercensal years computed using an exponential growth rate
and adjusted so that a weighted average of the intercensal years
was equal to the observed national rate during Intercensal years.
IV. Results
Table 2 contains the results for a single equation cigarette
demand model and a simultaneous equation cigarette demand model.
The single equation cigarette demand model assumes that the clean
air law is exogenous. This model provides an alternative to the
simultaneous model and, by comparison, illustrates the endogene—
11ity bias. The single equation model is estimated using weighted
least squares.
The results from the estimation of the single equation
cigarette demand model, presented in Column 1of Table 2,
generally conform to a—priori expectations. The real cigarette
price and clean air law are both negative and statistically
significant. The own—price elasticity of demand implied by these
estimates is equal to —0.276. This estimate is consistent with
other recent studies of the demand for cigarettes.8
Of the three smuggling variables, theshort distance
exporting variable and long distance smuggling variable are
negative and significant asexpected. Theshort diatance
importing variable is,however, positive and insignificant.
These results suggest that star tth higher prices lose sales
to states with lower prices. The real income variable is positive
hut is not statistically significant at conventional levels, with
an implied income elasticity of 0.06. Whilecigarettes may be a
ormal good for some individuels, since health is also a normal
good, an increase in income could have either a positive or
negative effect on cigarette demand. The low significance level
of the income variable may be a result of these two npposite
effects. The education variable is negative and significant,
For example, Baltagi end Levin (1986), using similar data
over the period from 1964 through 1980, estimate the own—price
elasticity of demand to be —0.22.Similarly, Forter (1985)
estimates the own-price elasticity of demand to fall in the range
from —0.29 to -0.05in m simultaneous equations model of
cigarette demand and supply.
12suggesting that more educated individuals are less likely to
engage in an unhealthy activity such as cigarette smokng. The
other sentiment variables, per capita tobacco production and the
fraction of the state population that belong to fundamentalist
religions, are also statistically significant. As expected,
stateswithgreater percapita tobacco production have
significantly higher cigarette sales than states producing little
or no tobacco, while states with larger fractions of the
population professing fundamentalist religions have lower per
capita cigarette sales.
The estimation results for the simultaneous equation model
are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.Column 2 contains
the results from the probit estimation of the clean air law
equation and Column 3 contains the results for the cigarette
demand equation containing the predicted value of the law. A two
equation model is necessary to control for the reverse causality
between cigarette sales and the passage of a clean air law. The
empirical verification of this causality assumption is found in
the coefficient 8,which was described above. The value of 8
cannot be directly estimated as a regression coefficient but can'
be estimated by the ratio of the coefficient of any variable from
the clean air law equation divided by the coefficient on the same
variable in the cigarette demand equation. All values of 8
computed using each of the variables which were significant in
13both equations were negative and statistically significant.' The
empirical evidence thus supports the endogeneity assumption and
the need for a two equation econometric model.°
As discussed above, the coefficients in the single equation
model are biased because of correlation of the clean air law with
the error term. A comperison the estimates in Column 1 with those
in Column 3 of Table 2 illustrates the effect of the endogeneity
bias. In the single equation model the clean air law coefficient
is negative and statistically significant, with a t—value of
about 2. -In the simultaneous equstion model, the clean air law
coefficient remains negative, but Ia now insignificant, with a t—
value of about I. The magnitude of the clean air law coefficient
also decreases by hout 23 percent in the simultaneous model.
These results show that ignoring the endogeneity of the law
variable results in overstating the impact of the clean indoor
air law on cigarette smoking.
To compute the variance of 0 let it1 equal the coefficient
f any significant independent variable in the clean air law
equation and let it2be the coefficient of the same variable in
the cigarette demand equation. 0a and o2, are the respective
variances- The variable 0is then tt1/tt2.The variance nf 0 is




The covariance of it1 and it2 is assumed to be zero.
o Endogeneity of the tax component of the cigarette price is
also a poaaibility. However, during the time period covered by
the data aet, nominal cigarette taxes were fairly stable and real
cigarette taxes actually decreased. Where taxea were raiaed, the
rationale was always revenue enhancement. These factors suggest
that endogeneity of the tax is not a serious issue.
14The eridogeneity problem can also result in bias in the
exogenous variable coefficients. However, a comparison of Column
1 with Column 3 of Table 2 shows that each of the exogenous vr. -
ablesmaintain the same signs and significance levels with almost
no change In coefficient values,
The results for the clean air law equation are presented in
Column 2 of Table 2. This equation can be interpreted as measur—
log the pressure to pass a clean air law. The price, income, and
smugglIng variables are all included in this equation as indirect
measures of cigarette demand. These variables should have the
opposite sign in the clean air law equation as they have in the
cigarette demand equation because cigarette demand has a negative
causal influence on the pressure to pass a clean air law, The
price,income, short distance import and export, and long
distance smuggling variables areall significant and,as
expected, have the opposite sign in the clean air law equation as
they have in the cigarette demand equation. The exogenous
sentiment variable measuring tobacco production is negative and
significant indicating thatthere Is less pressure to pass a
clean air law in states with greater tobacco production, as'
expected. The exogenous sentiment variablemeasuring
fundamentalism is positive, albeit insignificant. Finally, the
exogenous sentiment variable measuring education is positive and
significant, indicating that as education increases there is
increasing pressure to pass a clean air law.
15V. conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to estimate the impactof a
law restricting cigarette smoking in various public placesand
private workplaces on cigarette demand, Twoalternative models
are estimated under the competing hypothesesthat the law is
exogenous and that the law endogenous. Theeconometric results
ahow that cigarette sales have a significant causal effect onthe
passage of a clean air law, implying thatthe passage of the most
restrictive form of a clean indoor air law, that whichrestricts
smoking in private workplaces. is, in part, the resultof strong
anti-smoking sentiment. Ignoring the problem of endogeneity
results in Incorrectly attributing lower cigarette salesto the
clean air law. Results from the model which accountsfor
simultaneity indicate that states with lower cigarettesales are
more likely to have a clean air law and thatthe clean air law
has no significant effect on sales. This does not implythat the
enactment ofa clean air law would not reduce the levelof
smoking if such a law were passed in all states, but ratherthat
only states with low levels of smoking, thosewith strong
sentiment against smoking, are able to pass a restrictiveclean
indoor air law.
16Table 1
Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Variable Definition, Mean, and Standard Deviation
Workplace Law A dichotomous variable equal to one if a state has a law restricting
cigarette smoking in private workplaces, equal to zero otherwise.
O.O48, a0.214.
Cigarette Sales State tax—paid cigarette sales in thousands of packs per capita.
UO.128, a0.021.
Real Cigarette Average state retail cigarette price per pack in dollars, inclusive
Price of Federal, state, and local excise taxes and state sales taxes
applied to cigarettes, divided by the Consumer Price Index (1967=1).
w=O.289, m=O.033.
Short Distance An index measuring short distance export smuggling Incentives. The
Exports index Is a weighted average of differences between exporting (low
price) states' real cigarette prices and Importing (high price)
neighboring states' reel cigarette prices with weights based on
border populations and state populations. —O.OO5, rO.O12.
Short Distance An index measuring short distance import smuggling incentives, The
Imports index Is a weighted average of differences between importing (high
price) states' real cigarette prices and exporting (low price)
neighboring statesreal cigarette prices with weights based on
border populations. O.DO5, O.OO8.
Long Distance An index which measures the incentive to smuggle cigarettes long
Smuggling distance from Kentucky, Virginia, and North Caroline. The index is
positively related to differences between the state's real cigarette
price and the exporting states' real cigarette prices, and is
weighted by the states' populations. p=O.869E—04, m=O.205.
Tobacco Production State tobacco production in thousands of pounds per capita. =O.OO8,
a=O.026.
Real Income Money per capita personal Income, In tens of thousands, divided by
the consumer price index (19671). j0.388, O.O47.
High School Fraction of the state population ages 25 years and over with at least
Education a high school education. O.686, a0.074.
Fraction Fraction of the state population that are either Mormons or Southern
Fundamentalist Baptists. rO.O93, a0.107.
The means and standard deviations are weighted by the state population. All data are for

























Short Distance Exports —0.669 144.745 —D.667
(—16.79) (2.60) (—16.70)




































R2 0.762 0.619 0.760
The t—ratios are in parentheses. Each equation also includes
dichotomous variables for the years 1976 through 1985.




where log L(A) equals the log likelihood function when aexiniized
with respect to all the parameters and L(0) equals the log
likelihood function when maxiaized with respect tn the intercept
only.
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